Introduction
Taxation is a core governance function. It has the potential to shape relations between state and society in significant and distinctive ways. Tax revenues allow states to provide security and public goods. "The history of state revenue production," Margaret Levi declared, "is the history of the evolution of the state (1988: 1)." For these reasons, taxation should be accorded a central role in analyses of state building. There is a large historical literature, relating especially to Western Europe (and a smaller, but conceptually rich, political science literature on the interaction between states and citizens over taxes (Tilly, Levy, Bates, etc. ). Yet although the subject of state building is now high on academic and policy agendas, the relationship between state-building and taxation in the developing world has received almost no sustained scholarly attention.
This volume focuses specifically on taxation and state building in a range of contemporary 'developing' countries, from upper-middle income Poland and Russia to ultra poor rural Tanzania and Uganda. These countries both challenge and confirm some of the conclusions reached by earlier scholars who focused on high income countries.
Developing countries differ structurally from those in wealthier regions. They are politically and economically dependent on commodity exports; they often have large agrarian and informal sectors; some have recently emerged from central planning systems; they have high levels of exposure to external political and economic influence and to aid donors and international financial institutions. The core social scientific purpose of our volume is to demonstrate how, in those circumstances, taxation systems and polities interact with and shape one another. The core policy position, developed in the final chapter, is that a politically-informed analysis of the relationship between taxation and state formation often leads to recommendations different from those espoused by the "Washington Consensus".
Background
This book is founded on collaboration between three scholars who have long been researching the topic. Deborah Brautigam, Associate Professor at the American University, Washington DC, is a political scientist. She was one of the first people to put the governance dimensions of taxation on the agenda of international development agencies in a 1992 article written while she was an adviser to the World Bank. Over the past six years, she has been engaged in a long-term comparative study of the development of social democracy in Mauritius, in which issues of taxation loom large. This has financed three research programs, including one on taxation in developing countries.
The initial ideas for this volume were presented in a 2002 issue of the IDS Bulletin titled 'The New Politics of Taxation and Accountability'. Several of the contributors to that issue were invited to join the editors in this project. We have held two conferences on taxation and state-building, in 2002 and 2004, and the co-editors have met several times to work together, including a two-week period in August 2005. We began with a large array of potential contributors, and have rejected draft chapters that could not reach the required standard. To improve our regional and thematic balance, we have also commissioned three new contributions from scholars who did not attend either conference. In sum, the volume is the opposite of a set of conference papers. It represents the fruit of a long and careful process of intellectual and editorial critique, interaction, winnowing, and progress. It has been our intention from the beginning to produce a volume that would become the standard source on our major question: How does taxation contribute to state building in contemporary poor/developing countries?
Substance
Few social scientists would dissent from the proposition that patterns of state-society interaction are central to the construction of effective and accountable states. There is however less agreement about the identity of the central societal actors and political institutions. Contemporary comparative politics provides two main alternative answers.
The first is various categories of mobilized citizens acting through institutions of representation and electoral democracy. The second is mobile capital, acting to constrain and guide the state through the tacit threat of dis-investment or international capital transfer. In the contemporary high-income world, these two sources of constraint on the state are increasingly seen as being in direct conflict with one another. Especially in the context of concerns about globalization, the choice for the future is often presented as being between democracy and the power of (mobile and international) capital. Taxpayers are subsumed into one or other of these categories, but are not considered as a separate category of actors. Neither is the taxpaying relationship seen as a potential constraint on state power or a major focus of state-society interaction. The history of state formation in 'historical Europe' encourages us to think differently. At the extreme, and most notably in Britain and the Netherlands, the relationship between taxpayers and the state to a significant degree subsumed or substituted for the relationships with citizen-voters and capitalist investors, respectively. It is the contention of this book that by treating the taxpaying relationship -and its associated institutions -as analytically distinct, we can gain additional purchase in understanding processes of state formation. The book addresses two main questions, broadly in the following sequence:
1. How do taxation and sources of public revenue affect state building and governance in contemporary developing countries? A major axis of debate is whether the taxation relationship either (a) is intrinsically coercive and therefore inimical to consensual governance, or (b) as one prominent interpretation of European history suggests, provides an opportunity for the creation of consensual and representative government through 'revenue bargaining' between states and organized citizens. Chapters 2 to 5 focus on this issue. Chapter 2, an analytical review of the debate, provides an interpretation of the relevance of the European historical experience and an explanation of how contextual factors affect outcomes in the contemporary world. Chapters 3 to 5 deal comparatively with cases of coercive taxation (China and East Africa) or more or less consensual taxation (Poland and Russia). Today and in recent history, governments of many poor countries have depended heavily for revenue on taxes on primary commodity exports.
Such revenues have been almost the defining feature of poor countries from a public finance perspective. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with two contrasting cases of the impact of export taxes on state building. In one case -sugar in Mauritius -there was a great deal of bargaining between sugar producers and successive governments, which in turn contributed to effective state building. In the second case -nitrates in Chile -bargaining between producers and the state took place, but was never institutionalized.
2. What are the key political considerations involved in constructing arrangements that enable governments of contemporary developing countries to tax more effectively, more equitably, and more sustainably? Most industrialized countries have succeeded in creating high levels of both capacity and consent. Their governance rests on fiscal systems that are the subject of policy debate, but rarely thrown into fundamental question or doubt. Developing countries are more diverse and, in most cases, in a far less happy situation. Their tax systems are often regressive and distortionary. Tax administration is usually weak and characterized by extensive evasion and corruption. Coercive modes of taxation are common. In many cases overall tax levels are low, and large sectors of the economy escape the tax net entirely. What represents politically feasible tax reform in contemporary developing countries? While Chapters 1-7 bear on this question, it is the explicit focus of Chapters 8-10. Chapter 8 deals with one of the most problematic issues for tax administrations in contemporary poor countries: the enormous obstacles to levying direct taxes on the large informal sectors of the economy. The authors deal with it from a novel angle: on the basis of case study material from three countries, they explore the political conditions that might make it possible for governments to use private associations to collect income taxes. Chapter 9 focuses on a similarly important issue, from the perspective of Republican China in the early twentieth century: the creation of adequate organizational autonomy for tax administrations to enable them to perform effectively. It leads directly to Chapter 10, which sets out the main implications of the analysis in the previous chapters for tax policies and tax reform in contemporary developing countries. How might the standard advice of the tax professionals be modified to take account of state building objectives?
Location in the literature
The book builds on a range of existing literature, notably:
• A substantial historical literature on taxation and state building in Western Europe, notably by Charles Tilly; and including some 'extensions' of the analyses developed there into different contexts by, for example, Miguel Centeno. 1 • A large contemporary literature on state building in peripheral/developing countries, including Robert Bates, Catherine Boone, Peter Evans, Barbara Geddes Jeffrey Herbst, Terry Karl, and Crawford Young. 2 • A range of work, most of it published in journal articles, oriented around the framework for analyzing capacity and consent in the taxation relationship, as suggested by Margaret Levi. 3 There is however very little work published in book form that deals with taxation and state building in contemporary developing countries. The most prominent exception is Evan Liebermann's comparative historical exploration of the relationship between direct taxation and citizenship in Brazil and South Africa. 4 There is no competitor to this book currently in the market. To the best of our knowledge -and we collectively have very wide contacts among those researching the topic -there is no similar work in process.
The relevant literature appears mainly in article form.
Readership
The immediate target reader is either an academic/researcher interested in issues of state building and tax reforms in contemporary developing countries or someone working in a more directly policy-oriented role in one of a large number of organizations dealing with international NGOs. Individuals often move between these organizations. We have very good contacts with those networks. Each of the three co-authors has been involved over a long period of time in working with these agencies over taxation issues -Brautigam with the World Bank, and Fjeldstad and Moore mainly with a range of European agencies. In order to attract media attention to the book, we will organize -through the Centre for the Future State which Moore directs -a series of launch events in both Europe and Washington DC.
We shall also be aiming to place the book on the reading lists of a wide range of graduate classes in comparative politics (especially in the US) and in development studies (especially in Europe). One of us has recent successful experience of placing a very similar type of product -a co-edited book on the politics of poverty in developing countries, published by a leading university press -on a sufficient number of reading lists that it has been published in paperback. 5 In addition to the publicity mentioned above, the main strategy used will be extensive personal networking within these two constituencies. governments. It has been a source of tension and conflict between state authorities and rural people from the colonial period until today, and a major catalyst for many rural rebellions. By tracing the history of poll taxes in Tanzania and Uganda, the chapter examines how these taxes have impacted on state-society relations and why it has taken so long to abolish them. The authors' argue that insofar as poll taxes have contributed to democratization, this is not through the processes of state-society revenue bargaining, but by mobilizing rural people politically to combat a tax practice that they have experienced as repressive. As a result, the resentments caused by coercive local taxation have led central governments to abolish it.] are now establishing semi-autonomous revenue authorities as a means of improving tax compliance and collection. We know that they are often born into a rather hostile environment, and are often less successful than initially advertised. What lessons can we learn from the history of a rather similar attempt to create an autonomous revenue administration in a hostile environment: the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate in Republican China? The first lesson is already implicit in the design of contemporary revenue authorities: the need to establish and preserve the organization's own internal integrity, chiefly through "strategies of insulation." The second lesson is novel, and highly relevant to contemporary revenue authorities: the need for "strategies of goal achievement," to provide buffering from the pressures of a hostile environment.] 
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